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OVERVIEW OF U. S. POLICY 
By 
Robert C. Kiste 
I have recently written a couple of papers about American policy, 
or the lack thereof, in the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 
I have argued that the United States has never had a consciously 
conceived or a coherent policy that has actually been implemented and 
then actually followed in the islands. I have also attempted to counter 
the notion that there have been two policies, each with its own "time 
frame. What are these two supposed policies? 
For the first period, it is sometimes claimed that the United 
States had and followed a policy that has been referred to as the 
"ethnological zoo policy." The time frame was from inmeciiate1y after the 
second World War until the early 1960s, or one could say, the "zoo" was 
maintained during the first one and one half decades of the American 
administration. It is claimed that the Americans wanted to keep the 
islands out of the mainstream of world events and wanted to protect and 
preserve Micronesian cultures. Now it seems to me to be quite obvious 
that the United States has never been particularly concerned about the 
preservation of other societies. I feel reasonably certain that American 
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Indian peoples know this. With regard to European immigrants within the 
United States and since the last century. a "melting potlt phi losophy has 
prevai led. and the attendant notion has been that everyone shou ld becane 
100% American. With regard to peoples. and cultures abroad. the general 
American lack of sensitivity to other societies was the concern of a 
popular book. The .Y!i!l American. about a quarter of a century ago. 
The second period' began during the John F. Kennedy administration, 
about 1962 or 1963. and it continued until the late 1970's. It is argued 
that the zoo policy was (:ast aside. and a new policy of entrapment was 
initi.ated. The notion is that the United States set out to entrap the 
peoples of Micronesia in a vast web of dependency in order to keep the 
i~ lands firmly within the American sphere of influence. There are better 
reasons for arguing that there was indeed such a policy of entrapment 
rather than the zoo notion. 
In the early 1960 l s. the United States had fallen under severe 
criticism by the United Nations. The U.N. had sent a visiting mission to 
the Trust Territory. and the results were devastating fran. the American 
point of view. The destruction at' war remained evident in many places. 
Almost. nothing had been accanplished in the way of econanic development. 
There had been little movement in the direction of self-determination. 
No attempt had been made to foster a pa~cronesian identity. In 
general. things were judged to be in a deplorable condition. and it 
correctly appeared that the U.S. lacked any sense of real direction for 
the territory. 
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President Kennedy was clearly embarrassed. and the situation was 
further complicated by other matters. In the post war years. it was no 
longer respectable to have colonies, and Kennedy had gone on record that 
the U.S. opposed colonialism. The U.N. team essentially had said that the 
U.S. was maintaining a colony and doing a, poor job of it at that. 
Further embarrassment occurred when a polio epidemic swept through the 
Marshall Islands and out of neglect or lack of foresight, vaccine had not 
been made available in Micronesia. 
Kennedy wanted some positive action, and he appointed a study 
commission to be headed by Dr. Anthony Solomon, a Harvard economist. 
Solomon was instructed to make an investigative tour of the territory and 
come back with a set of recommendations. Solomon went out to the 
territory in the early part of 1963, and it was assumed from the outset 
that it was absolutely necessary for the islands to remain in the U.S. 
camp. Upon the completion of his study, Solomon believed that if the U.S. 
initiated greatly improved education and health systems, launched an 
ambitious scheme of capital improvement projects, and stimulated economic 
development with a substantial emphasis on agriculture, then the 
Micronesians would easily be persuaded to elect to remain under the 
protective wing of their benefactor. He urged that all of this be 
accomplished quickly and that a plebiscite be held early. Indeed, he 
believed that it could all be settled within five years. With the wisdom 
of hindsight, Solomon's optimism seems quite naive today. 
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Sane observers now claim the Solomon Cannission's recoornendations 
were actually followed. Journalist David Nevin in his book, The American 
Touch in Micronesia, outlines the incorrectness of such a claim. First 
of all, Kennedy had already begun to launch some new initiatives in the 
territory prior to Solomon's involvement. Kennedy had authorized 
increases in expendi tures for the terri tory to augment programs in 
education and health. The point is, the flow of U.S. dollars which was to 
becane massive in sca 1 e in future years had conmenced pri or to and 
without the advice of Solomon. Solomon submitted his report in late 
1963, and very soon thereafter, John F. Kennedy fell to the assassin's 
bullets. There is no evidence that the subsequent administration of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson took the report seriously. A third period of 
the American administration of the TTPI was to begin in the very late 
1970's when self-government began to be achieved by the four separate 
political entities that were to emerge in the territory. 
Prior to the late 1970's, however, there were two distinct and 
quite different eras of American rule in Micronesia, and they were as I 
have briefly described them above. The first period lasted from the end 
of World War II to about 1963; it has been labelled as the period of the 
ethnological zoo, or alternatively, the period of benign neglect. The 
second period has been referred to by sane as the one in which the U.S. 
pursued a policy of entrapment, and it continued up until the late 
1970's. Each of these two periods may be examined in greater detail. 
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With regard to the first period, it must be understood that the 
territory was not like most colonies of former times. The islands had no 
economic resources that were valued by the United States. America's main 
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concern was strategic, and this was very clear after the war. Indeed, 
Micronesia was the only strategic trust territory of the eleven that were 
created within the framework of the U.N. following World War II. As long 
as its military interests were served, the U.S. had no other particular 
concerns for the area. The Marshalls were used for the U.S. 's nuclear 
testing programs, and the northern Marianas, particularly Saipan, were 
used for covert C.I.A. operations. Foreign nationals were kept out, and 
even the entry of U.S. citizens was restricted. There were no pressures 
from other sources to do anything else with regard to the area. Most 
Americans did not know that the U.S. had a trust territory, and those who 
did evidenced little in the way of tangible concern. There certainly was 
no political lobby or interest group concerned with Micronesia, and the 
U.S. Department of Defense had what it wanted. 
Nonetheless, and even though there was little direct concern shown 
about the islands [outside of the military], American values played a 
crucial role in determining what occurred. This was manifest in two 
ways. First, the manner in which Americans thought about themselves had 
important consequences for the administration of Micronesia. Secondly, 
American values helped to determine the kinds of programs that were 
actually initiated. 
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How did .Americans see themselves? Certainly at" the end of World 
War II, .Americans saw themselves as the defenders of democracy and the 
free world. The war had been fought to defeat the imperialistic 
expansion of Japan and Germany, and there was some justification for the 
image that the .Americans held of themselves. But this is only part of 
the story. Gaining possession of the bulk of Micronesia from Japan was 
not thought of as an act of colonialism. Most .Americans have never 
thought of their nation as being a colonial power. The U.S. was born 
with a war of independence, a revolution to throw off the shackles of 
British colonial rule. Early in their schooling, .Americans are taught 
that their country has only fought to defend freedom, independence, and 
democracy. All nations have their myths, and the .American myth makes it 
inconceivable for the vast majority of Americans to perceive themselves 
as citizens of a colonial power. That the original thirteen colonies 
expanded across much of the North American continent incorporating the 
indigeous inhabitants into their nation is not viewed as an act of 
colonial expansion by most Americans. The acquisition of the Philippines 
in island Southeast Asia, .American Samoa, Gu~and Hawaii in the Pacific, 
and several entities in the Caribbean has not been viewed as colonial 
expansion. Alaska was not viewed differently. 
The point is, the vision of Americans has been obscured by their 
myth. As one consequence, the nation has never seen the need to create a 
colonial service. It follows that there was never a need to develop a 
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colonial policy. In part, all of this explains why a clear cut policy 
was never. fonnulated and implemented for the Trust Territory. Reflecting 
American notions about the U.S. as a colonial power, the Secretary of War 
argued in 1946 that: 
Acquisition of (Micronesia) by the United States does not 
represent an attempt at colonization or exploitation. 
Instead, it is merely the acquisition by the United States 
of the necessary bases for the defense of the security of 
the Pacific for the future world. To serve such a purpose 
they must belong to the United States with absolute power 
to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies; they are 
outposts. (Quoted from Fluker, et. al., 1978:89) 
Turning to the impact of American values, those programs that were 
launched early in the American administration were· very dear to the 
hearts of Americans. The U.S. Navy administered the Trust Territory 
until 1951 when it was turned over to the Department of Interior and thus 
civilian control. With regard to military rule, the Navy's charter was 
very vague; there were no clear instructions. Nonetheless, programs were 
initiated in three areas which reflected values at the core of the 
American character. 
First, Americans are committed to universal education. It is 
Simply assumed that education is absolutely essential for happiness and 
success in the world. Navy officers assumed that an American model of 
education was suitable for the small island communities of Micronesia, 
and the possibility that some modifications might be more appropriate for 
7 
island life was apparently not raised. Actually, education amounted to 
little at the time. Navy enlisted men attempted to train Micronesians to 
serve as classroom teachers; the training was quite brief, and it is an 
understatement to say that the teachers were little equipped for their 
chores. Nonetheless, most communities had small one roam schools built 
of local materials, and children spent a few (often a very few) hours 
sane days in those structures. The important thing, however, was the 
fact that the notion became implanted that every Mncronesian child had 
the right to be educated in a Western style. 
Secondly. there are similar values with regard to medical care. It 
was inco~ivable to Navy personnel that medical care wuld not be 
. available in every COIIIIIJnity. Accordingly~ a health aide was trained· and 
. placed in most every village and settlement. The training was modest, 
but for the first time, some medical care was i1llllediately· at hand. for 
Micronesians. Along with the modest skills of the health aides, 
penicillin and other drug$ and medicines were made available. Death 
rates, and most iq»rtantly, infant mortality rates were reduced.· The 
rate of population growth rapidly increased. and universal medical care 
came to be accepted as the due ri ghts of all. 
Thirdly, and holding true to their cherished myth, Navy men felt 
that they had no alternative but to attempt to introduce American foms 
of danocrattc govemnent..Tbey started at the village or community 
level. Young na-.,al officers infonnedMicronesians that they should elect 
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local magistrates and councils to govern their communities. The Navy 
administration wanted to conduct its relations with the people through 
such elected leaders and felt uncomfortable with the notion of hereditary 
chiefs. Quite commonly, the Americans thought they were successful when 
they were not. Chiefs and other traditional leaders appointed themselves 
as magistrates and councilmen, and the Americans were pleased that the 
Micronesians were so quick to grasp the essentials of democracy. 
Nonetheless, the seeds were planted, and eventually, Micronesians would 
prove fervent in their desire to elect legislative bodies at the local, 
district, and territory wide levels. 
The important point is, some very important trends were begun early 
in the first period of American rule. There was no overall plan or 
conception of what should be done. Rather, initiatives rooted in 
American values were launched with a faith in their correctness. The 
entire enterprise was certainly not thought of as a colonial venture. 
Also important for later years, no attention was given to economic 
development. 
In the second period of the U.S. Administration of the Trust 
Territory, there are several things which help us explain what occurred. 
There was an increased commitment to efforts in the areas of education, 
health care, and the fostering of democratic institutions. Also, there 
was a very marked increase in the number of capital improvement 
projects. These increases reflected another very basic American notion. 
There is the idea that almost any problem can be solved if enough money 
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is spent. In many respects, this was the notion behind John Kennedy's 
"New Frontier" and lyndon Johnson's "Great Society." In both cases, it 
was thought that social problems could be solved jf only enough money 
were made available. Both programs spilled over in.to Micronesia. 
An increase in funding initiated by Kennedy was continued under the 
Johnson administration. Around 1960. there was .a ceiling of 7.5 million 
dollars in the Trust Territory budget, but the actual funds appropriated 
by the U.S. Congress never reached that amount. In 1962, funds were mgre 
than doubled and reached $16 million. By 1967, the budget had ri·sen to 
$25 mi] Hon. and it was daub led to $50 mill1 on by 1970. By the end of 
the 1970's, the Trust Territory budget was in excess of $100 million 
dollars. 
Sanewhere around the middle 1960's, the eff.ort to develop the Trust 
Territory literally went out of control. In 1966. Peace Corps 
Volunteers were sent to Micronesia, and their numbers were greater per 
capita than any other place in the world. Federal welfare programs 
continued to increase. eventually number1ng 166 separate programs. The 
Peace Corps and the federal programs were in addition to and not included 
as part of the territorial budget. 
What were some of the resu.lts1 In education, a massive amount of 
money was spent. American teachers were recruited to teach the English 
language and a public high school was created in each administrative 
district. Project Head-Start was implemented for tiny youngsters, and 
college scholarships became easily available for those freshly out of 
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high school. No thought was given as to what all the education was for, 
and educated youths returned home to unemployment and disappointment. 
In the area of health care, again massive sums were spent on 
sophisticated equipment which often as not went unused and eventually 
deteriorated. Almost nothing was initiated in the area of preventive 
medicine, and overall, it is an unfortunate fact that health care has 
probably gone down in quality in the last decade or so. 
In the political arena, district legislatures were founded in the 
1950's. They began as adVisory bodies, but eventually evolved into true 
legislatures. In 1965, the Congress of Micronesia was established. One 
of its earliest actions was to inaugurate negotiations regarding the 
future political status of the territory. Those negotiations have led us 
to the current political situation. Three Micronesian entities, the 
Marshalls, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia (Kosrae, Ponape, 
Truk, and Yap) will probably become states in free association with the 
United States. The Northern Marianas will become a U.S. Commonwealth. 
Numerous capital improvement projects were funded with the flow of 
federal funds. Schools, airports, roads, and water catchment systems 
were built. However, there was little or no coordination of what was 
constructed, and one community in Truk District was equipped with fire 
hydrants with no water supply system. No thought was given to long term 
maintenance of the physical plant. Money was being spent, and there was 
a notion that progress was being made. 
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A third period of the American administration may also be 
identified. This is the era of self-rule. In the late 1970's, the four 
political entities noted above began to assume some measure of 
self-rule. As noted earlier, it appears likely that there will be three 
states in free association with the U.S. and the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Marianas. The Micronesians have taken to heart the lessons 
about democracy, and they are understandably anxious to take more control 
over their own affairs. 
To sum up, I have attempted to provide a review of the United 
States' administration of the Trust Territory. I have tried to put two 
myths to rest. The United States has never had a clear policy regarding 
Micronesia. There was no "zoo policy" and there was no conscious plan to 
entrap Micronesia into a state of dependency. I have argued that an 
American ~ has prevented Americans from seeing themselves as a 
colonial power, and that some very basic American values shaped the 
courses of action that have been implemented. Those values and their 
appropriateness for island life were never questioned. 
It is ironic that while little was actually planned, the end result 
of American rule is that the Micronesian states are very dependent upon 
the U~ited States - much as the Solomon Report envisaged. While there 
was no conscious deSign, it is certain that some observers in Washington, 
D.C. were aware of the direction that events were taking. No one blew 
the whistle, and the new political arrangements with the Micronesian 
states do provide the strategic requirements wanted by the Department of 
Defense. 
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